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COGNITION AND CONSCIOUSNESS: HUMANITIES 
AND THE ELEMENTARY SCHOOL TEACHER *  
by 
Maxine Greene 
"Liberating education," writes Paulo Freire, "consists in acts of cognition."1 
It involves a naming of the world, a striving towards awareness of reality and 
self-awareness. The study of the humanities ought to make both possible: a 
widening of cognitive perspectives on experience; a rediscovery "of my actual 
presence to myself, the fact of my consciousness which is in the last resort what 
the word and the concept of consciousness mean."2 It may also make possiible a 
new kind of clarity and a new kind of care, a vigilance against what Afbert 
Camus calls "plague/' 
In the novel The Plague, Tarrou and Dr. Rieux are both concerned with the 
naming of the world, as t!hey are concerned with decency and love. One evening 
they take "an hour off-for friendship" from· their fight against the pestilence; 
and Tarrou tells the story of his life. He has discovered, he says, that no one on 
earth is free from plague. 
'And I know, too, that we must keep endless watch on ourselves lest in a care­
less moment. we breathe in somebody's face and fasten the infection on him. 
What's natural is the microbe. All the rest-health, integrity, purity (if you 
like )-is a product of the human will, of a vigilance that must never falter. 
The good man, the man who infects hardly anyone, is the man who has the 
fewest lapses of attention. And it needs tremendous will-power, a never 
ending tension of the mind td avoid such lapses. Yes, Rieux, it's a wearying 
business, being plague-stricken. But it's still more wearying to refuse to 
be it.'3 
To have plague is not only to be indifferent; it is to be abstract, to use "big" 
words like salvation and heroism, to obscure what is really happening between 
the person and his world. Tarrou concludes by saying that "our troubles spring 
from our failure to use plain, clean-cut language" and that he has resolved 
"always to speak-and to act-quite clearly, as this was the only way of setting 
myself on the right track." And when Rieux asks him if he knows what path to 
follow for attaining peace, Tarrou replies: "The path of sympathy." 
It is with self-awareness, clarity, and sympathy in mind that I want to talk 
about the humanities for elementary school teachers. I want to talk about them 
as resources, as possibilities which-if appropriated and acted upon-may arouse 
individuals to self-consciousness and the kind of knowing that transforms what 
is given into what might be. When I speak of elementary school teachers, I ihave 
persons in mind, not personnel defined by a professional specialty. I have diverse 
*All future pu.bliculiun rights ro6ervecl by lhe author. 
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human beings in mind, men and women who have chosen-or been assigned­
the complex project of teaching skills to the young, molding them, guiding 
them, and trying to set them free. Coping with dilemmas and paradoxes day 
after day, such persons are commonly perceived as custodians, managers, 
enablers, or mere agents of the culture. They are seldom thought about as 
existing human beings condemned (like all other human beings) to seek identity 
and meaning in an indifferent world. Yet elementary school teachers (like 
numerous other people in our society) live and work in situations where it is 
extraordinarily difficult to feel oneself to be a "Subject," the author of one's 
own life and career. They live and work in situations where it is even difficult to 
think, if thinking is what Hannah Arendt says it is: a "soundless, solitary 
dialogue" of "me with myself." It is nearly impossible to think in places "where 
everybody is swept away unthinkingly by what everybody else does and 
believes in."4 Yet without opportunities to engage in private, internal con· 
versations, an individual is likely to remain submerged in social reality-unable 
to feel himself to be either a "Subject" or what Soren Kierkegaard called a 
"Single One." 
I am interested in providing opportunities for transforming what has been un­
questioned into the questionable,5 for posing relevant and worthwhile question 
against a "ba�kground awareness" of the life the individual has lived. I am 
interested in providing opportunities for finding new possibilities, new ways of 
being human and acting upon the world. It seems to me that participation in 
some of the works that compose the humanities can open up such opportunities. 
It also seems to me that participation of this kind may increase the feeling of 
presentness and make people feel more authentically alive. 
What are the humanities? What is their focus? What do they have to do with 
the day-to-day business of living, of teaching in an elementary school? Tradi­
tionally, of course, they were considered rites of passage for gentlemen's sons. 
Largely linguistic and literary studies, they were intended to induct those young 
men into the learned elite: but they were also relied upon to introduce them to 
virtue, beauty, and truth. Albert William Levi gives some idea of how funda· 
mental they were thought to be over the generations when he traces the un­
broken tradition in the humanities: 
44 
The Platonic Academy with its Pythagorean faith that mathematics is some· 
how the source of principles of moral and aesthetic value; the Roman 
rhelorical impulse which allied persuasion to the pursuit of moral virtue and 
the aims of the responsible commonwealtb ; the conservative labors of early 
monasticism lovingly transcribing the great works of pagan culture to out­
last a time of troubles; the twelfth century cathedral schools of Orleans and 
Chartres for whom grammatical analysis was but a labor of love performed 
upon the enduring texts to aid in the extraction of the beauty and wisdom 
they contained; the courts of Rimini and Urbino, mingling the ghost of 
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Plato with the essentials of decorous behavior and the development of 
character; the flowering of Oxford and Cambridge from the days of Thomas 
More to the time of John Locke, where the Greek and Roman classics were 
used to humanize the law and to provide a kind of magnanimous foundation 
for the national civil service . . . 6 
Throughout they were governed by an ideal of humanitas, as well as a belief that 
the principles of value were there to be "extracted" from the linguistic forms in 
which they were contained. Humanitas refers to an essence defined as the purest 
rationality, long considered to be the perfection of the human animal. Fully 
actualized, man turned his eyes upward to the light; he was believed capable of 
"seeing" Truth, Beauty, and the Good once he was liberated by the "liberal 
arts," or what came to be called the humanities. 
Today we no longer believe in pre-existent values, hanging like fixed stars 
in the sky. Nor do we posit a universe ruled by a logos, a principle of order or 
rationality entirely knowable to the human mind. Most importantly, we can no 
longer think in terms of a human essence, a single abstract quality which defines 
"Man" for all time. We know now that anything is possible where the human 
creature is concerned, that there are innumerable ways of being human to be 
found across the earth. "Paragon of animals" and "quintessence of dust;" world­
builder and murderer; symbol-user, tool-user, and destroyer; sentient, intuitive, 
violent, peaceable, social, solitary, lustful, repressed, ignorant, wise: human 
beings are all these things and more. Scientific knowledge about man proliferates 
daily; we have never bad so much information about his functions, his instincts, 
his behaviors, his institutions. But the ancient question, "What is man?," is no 
longer answerable. The contemporary question is "Who am I?" or "What can I 
make of myself?" The contemporary concern is not with definition nor with 
locating "Man" on some hierarchy of being; it is with finding ways to overcome 
feelings of powerlessness, nobodyness, invisibility. If the humanities are to be 
relevant today, it seems to me, they must connect with the struggle to be. 
There remains the question, however, of how we are to constitute the human· 
ities. Levi draws three propositions which he believes define the area: 
1. The humanities are not the natural sciences, the social sciences, or the fine 
arts. 
2. The humanities are identical with the liberal arts. 
3. The liberal arts are three, that is, the arts of communication, the arts of 
continuity, and the arts of criticism. (This means, respectively, the languages 
and literatures, history, and philosophy.)7 
Harold Taylor has a different proposal. He believes that we should return 
to the root of the matter, in the quality and variety of experience available 
to the race, and that we consider education in the humanities not as a prob-
45 
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lem of developing a separate set of courses in a separate section of the 
curriculum, but as the creation of a spirit of inquiry and aesthetic interest 
throughout the whole curriculum and the entire environment of the school 
or college. The arts themselves must be a central element jn that environ­
ment. In the time of the Renaissance it was the creation of new modes of 
perception and sensibility, a new way of looking at the world by poets, 
writers, painters, sculptors, architects, and thinkers that broke the chains of 
orthodox philosophy and the conventional wisdom. The spirit of humanism 
and enlightenment, then as now, is to be found in the sensibility of the 
artist, the scholar, the student, and the citizen, all of them using their re­
sources as creators, critics, audience, and learners, each with his own function, 
each learning from the other, each willing to accept what is human as the 
locus of ultimate concem.8 
Father Walter Ong has still another view. He confronts the problem squarely and 
(in his case mapping the field for a Daedalus conference on the subject) decides 
to restrict the term, to think of it as "the study of man's own creative or 
imaginative works." 
These consist of verbal creations, oral or written, as well as of art, music, the 
dance, and so on. Even this sense Is somewhat protean, for the range of 
"creative" and "imaginative" varies. It would certainly include in some way 
architecture and many crafts, but how far the meaning is to be carried into 
such areas as road-building, cookery, yoga, and mountain-climbing is matter 
for discussion. One can al.so take the humanities in the larger sense as the 
study of man in his relationship to the entire human life world, thus including 
such subjects as philosophy and anthropology and history. And once history 
is admitted, almost everything can be got in, directly or indirectly, under one 
or another perfectly honest rubric. The Daedalus conference in fact focused 
chiefly on the humanities in the restricted sense, but so as to include history, 
which, of course, takes the pinch out of the restriction.9 
And later on he points suggestively to our deepening knowledge of the past and 
to the way in which "absorption of the past" gives the present its identity. He 
proposes that we orient ourselves to a synchronic present, a here and now where 
all the ages meet. Our sense of the present as present may then lead us to 
"historically based self-study," an approach to the humanities focusing "intently 
on ourselves in our own life world." 
Unlike Levi, and like Taylor and Ong, I would include the fine arts in my 
conceptualization of the humanities. I would also include a historical perspective 
and the "doing" of some philosophy. My mapping of the field is in part a func­
tion of my concern about the proliferation of what Jacques Ellul calls "tech­
nique," the growing influence of behaviorism, the infectiousness of our particu-
46 
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lar "plague." Ellul speaks of autonomous, self-generating technique which no 
longer rests on tradition but on "previous technical procedures." He speaks of a 
civilization constructed "by technique (makes a part of civilization only what 
belongs to technique), for technique (in that everything in this civilization must 
serve a technical end), and is exclusively technique (in that it excludes whatever 
is not technique or reduces it to technical form. "10 He describes a human being 
ill at ease in a strange new environment: "He seeks to flee-and tumbles into the 
snare of dreams; he tries to comply and falls into the life of organizations; he 
feels maladjusted-and becomes a hypochrondriac."11 But the technological 
society has techniques to handle these things and make them bearable; it takes 
action upon man himself. Here is where the influence of behaviorist thinking 
becomes manifest. The locus of control is outside of the individual; envi.ron­
mental variables are manipulated so as to reinforce certain responses and eradi­
cate others; free will and self-initiated choosing are denied. B. F. Skinner 
(writing unashamedly about "a technology of behavior") says that "environ­
mental contingencies now take over functions once attributed to autonomous 
man, and certain questions arise. Is man then 'abolished'? Certainly not as a 
species or as an individual achiever. It is the autonomous inner man who is 
abolished, and that is a step forward."1 2 Ellul's diagnosis of-or his bearing wit­
ness to-the fact of the technological society and Skinner's affirmation of the 
"exciting possibilities" in behavioral controls both motivate me to conceive the 
humanities as a way of battling "plague." 
[ place my stress, as I have said, on reflectivenessand self-awareness, on con­
sciousness, becoming present to oneself. There is no other way, it seems to me, 
of rebelling effectively against the depredations and manipulations of technique; 
there is no better way of discovering autonomy. l include the arts-literature, 
painting, drama, film, sculpture, dance-because I believe that encounters with 
the arts release people into their own subjectivity, their "inner time." By "inner 
time" I mean what Henri Bergson called "duration," time inwardly lived as 
compared with time measured by the clock.1 3 It is the time of the inner self, 
which is always in flux, always becoming, unified by memory. "Inner time" 
also refers to what William James called the "stream of consciousness"14 
which makes continuity possible for the individual as his attention flits and 
perches, as his mind turns in multiple directions, as he makes his way through 
the distracting world. The "stream" is perhaps best rendered in Virginia Woolf's 
To the Lighthouse or in James Joyce's A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man, 
the events of which all take place in inner time. There are layers of experience; 
there is a self-dissolvingintrospection; the past is present, the present past: 
The cold slime of the ditch covered his whole body; and, when the bell rang 
for study and the lines filed out of the playrooms, he felt the cold air of the 
corridor and staircase inside his clothes. He still tried to think of what was the 
right answer. Was it right to kiss his mother or wrong to kiss his mother? 
47 
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What did that mean, to kiss? You put your face up like that to say good­
night and then his mother put her face down. That was to kiss. His mother 
put her lips on his cheek; her lips were soft and they wetted his cheek; and 
they made a tiny little noise: kiss. Why did people do that with their two 
faces? Sitting in the study hall he opened the lid of his desk and changed the 
number pasted up inside from seventy-seven to seventy-six. But the Christmas 
vacation was very far away: but one time.it would come because the earth 
moved round always.15 
Now it is true that encounters with works of art are not like encounters in the 
everyday world. A work of art is an "unreal object," a created thing, to be en­
countered in the imaginary mode of awarene� by a reader or a beholder capable 
of breaking with the mundane, the everyday. A consciousness must "have the 
possibility of positing a hypothesis of unreality ,''16 writes,Jean-Paul Sartre, if it 
is to imagine at all. Stephen Dedalus's memories and free associations in the 
passage just quoted are unreal in Sartre's sense. They are not taken from a diary 
James Joyce kept when he was in school; they are not James Joyce's own 
recollections; they are not a confession of a real person trying to understand 
himself. The passage does, however, embody in language certain ways in which 
Joyce was conscious of the world around; and the reader can come in touch with 
Joyce's consciousness by lending the passage some of his own life, until 
Stephen's chill becomes his chill and Stephen's playing with the sound and feel 
of a mother's kiss becomes his playing. The reader, as Sartre puts it, discloses 
what is in a novel by bringing into being within his own consciousness; but he 
can only do this if he is willing to exclude or "bracket out" his ordinary ways of 
seeing. Sartre calls upon the reader to be attentive and thoughtful, to remain 
"conscious of disclosing in creating, of creating by disclosing . . . "1 7 John 
Dewey makes a similar point when he talks about "art as experience": "There is 
work done on the part of the percipient as there is on the part of the artist. The 
one who is too lazy, idlle, or indurated in convention to perform this work will 
not see or hear. His 'appreciation' will be a mixture of scraps of learning with 
conformity to norms of conventional admiration and with a confused, even if 
genuine, emotional excitation. "1 8 
The reader or beholder must "work" under the guidance of the artist; he 
must use his imagination and hold in mind that he is entering an illusioned 
world. To approach, say, Pablo Picasso's Guernica matter-of-factly, unimagina­
tively, as if it were a true representation of an actual bombing, would be to 
deprive oneself of a confrontation with images of pain-the image of the 
crying woman, the horse's tongue, the sole of the foot, the palm of the hand. 
It would be to refuse the protest in that pain, the shock of inexpre�ible mean­
ings which must be chosen, finally, by each one who dares to experience 
Picasso's lines, shadings, forms. To read The Plague as if it were an account of an 
actual pestilence in Oran would be to deny the possibility of disclosing within 
48 
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one's own consciousness the meanings of exile and the loss of love embodied in 
the book. To watch Harold Pinter's The Caretaker as if it were a photographic 
account of unpleasant derelict and a failed psychotic poet would be to miss the 
silences under the crosstalk, the oral ballet, the fearful sound of lost identities. 
("I can't move without them papers,11 says Davies. "They tell you who I am. 
You see! I'm stuck without them."19 "Then I went along to people," Ashton 
says later, telling the story of his shock treatment, "but they wanted to take me 
in, but I wasn't going to go in • . .  anywhere. So I couldn't do any work, because 
I . . .  I couldn't write any more, you see. I couldn't write my name."20 ) 
Bringing such works to being within inner time, achieving them as works of art, 
the individual may well discover dimensions of his historical situation otherwise 
beyond his reach. He may even become ready to engage in the kind of knowing 
called praxis. Freire says that "Liberation is a praxis, the action and reflection of 
men upon their world in order to transform it."21 Sartre says that it is a going 
beyond or a refusal of some given reality "in lhe name of a reality to be 
produced. "2 2 
Many theorisls of art have lalked about art as the "delineation of the pos­
sible." Dorothy Walsh, for instance, says that a work of art "always involves the 
imaginative transformalion of the given."2 3 Unlike possibilities identified by the 
sciences, works of art remain possibilities; they cannot be realized in the public, 
intersubjective world. They remain "isolated and irreducibly plural": Moby Dick 
does not improve on or correct The Scarlet Letter; Wysses does not negate The 
Odyssey. They offer alternative visions which do not compete, visions to be 
appropriated in inner time. Sartre suggests. that literature can arouse readers to 
reflective consciousness because o� the ways in which it permits them to per­
ceive new openings for themselves, new ways of being human and acting upon 
the wor1d. Works of art also reveal themselves to the indignation of their readers 
or beholders, as do (clearly) the Guemica and The Plagu.e. In the one case the 
indignation may hold within it a refusal to tolerate massacres, an insistence on 
survival, no matter how. In the other case, the indignation may carry a promise 
to side with the victims whenever there are pestilences, always to fight the 
plague. But even a book like John Updike's Rabbit Run, which deals with an 
apparently ordinary man in an ordinary American small town, can appeal in 
that fashion. So can a movie like Clockwork Orange or Easy Rider or The 400 
Blows. It is not necessary that the work deal explicitly with the universe's in­
justices or with man's inhumanity to man. The images of clutter and decay in 
Rabbit Run, the breaking free, the shapelessness, the difficulty of finding a 
destination : all these are likely to evoke experiences of being "on the way," 
confronting possibles, suffering freedom, discovering voids. If nothing else, the 
indignation appealed to may have to do with the sense of incompleteness, the 
felt need to transcend or to transform. The indignation and the reflectiveness, 
of course, occur within the interior world of the one who encounters the work 
imaginatively. It is in that interior world that meanings must be constituted and 
49 
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some kind of order attaii.ned. The interesting question (one I shall explore a bit 
later on) has to do with the effect this has on action in the "outer world/' on 
choosing and identity. 
Before touching on that question, which must involve me with the "doing" 
of philosophy, I must point to the inescapabiility of criticism and critical ques­
tions in the study of the humanities. It is often said that teaching is identical 
with criticism, especially when teaching is carried on for the sake of making 
particular art forms accessible to others. To criticize means to elucidate, to 
describe, perhaps to interpret and explain. It is not necessarily to evaluate or 
give a verdict, although it is difficult for any critic to be neutral when he does 
his job of work. Criticism is a type of performance, a verbal performance. It 
involves the application of certain principl1es, certain ideas concerning the 
the nature of art, to discourse about works of art themselves. It must begin in 
the critic's appreciative and direct confrontation, with his imaginative involve· 
ment, his intuitions, his release into subjectivity. If it ended there, however, it 
would not be criticism. To sigh or to throw up one's hands or to laugh in delight 
would not. lead to understanding of the work as work of art; nor would it help 
anyone else appreciate the novel, play, painting, or film. 
I am suggesting that the elementary school teacher, like others attempting to 
engage with the arts, pay heed to the part that may be played by critics in 
revealing particular works to consciousness. The good critic, writes Arnold 
Isenberg, "gives us directions for perceiving, and does this by means of the idea 
he imparts to us, which . . .  guides us in the discrimination of details, the organ­
ization of parts . . . .  "24 He points, as it were, to qualities within a work, to 
color combinations, melodic sequences, metaphors and symbols, the action of a 
hero, the imaginary space within a film. Pointing, he attempts to afford his 
readers new perceptions, new disclosures, so that they can more effectually 
choose themselves with respect to the work. And that, after all, is the test: 
whether or not the critic can intensify the individual's appreciation, enrich his 
vision, free him to bring the work of art int0o being for himself. 
The importance of certain kinds of criticism must be as clear in other people's 
experience as it is in mine. I believe that various critics taught me to see the 
"snow", the sparkling highlights in John Constable's landscapes; the color-facets 
that give monumentality to Cezanne's work; the desolate, glowing tones in 
Rouault's portraits; the angular bodies and mask-like faces in Picasso's Les 
Demoiselles d'Avignon with all their evocations of Africa, ancient Iberia, Egypt, 
Greece, Cezanne. I believe that critics taught me to respond to montage and 
visual metaphors in film; to see how, in Antonioni's L'Avuen tura, mountains 
and walls reveal the inner lives of the characters; to discover the synaesthetic 
effects, the commingling of the senses resulting from the camera becoming our. 
"virtual body";25 to recognize the importance of camera-angles, fade-out.s, dis­
continuous cinematic space.26 I would say the same about literary criticism and 
dramatic criticism with regard to the occasions on which they helped me see. 
50 
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"My task which I am trying to achieve," wrote Joseph Conrad about his fiction, 
is by the power of the written word to make you hear, to make you feel-it is, 
before all, to make you see. That-and no more, and it is everything. If I 
succeed, you shall find there according to your deserts: encouragement, con­
solation, fear, charm-all you demand-and, perhaps, also that glimpse of truth 
for which you have forgotten to ask."27 This might wen be the declared task of 
the honest critic: to enable his readers to "see" in such a way that they are 
liberated to find in their own subjectivities according to their deserts . . . .  
It must be remembered, however, that criticism is, at best, an imperfect art. 
The critic can never fully translate the symbolic structure that is the work of art; 
he can never institute appxeciation in his reader; he can never determine the dis­
coveries his reader will make through his own experiences with Cezanne, Picasso, 
Truffaut, Antonioni, Melville, Joyce, Brecht, Williams, Pinter, Yeats, Pound, and 
the rest. Crucial for an understanding of criticism and its relevance in the study 
of the humanities is the recognition of the importance of what Murray Krieger 
calls "our radically diverse, autonomous experiences" of works of art. Critics 
offer us lenses, perspectives, limited visions which enable us to see what their 
categories permit us to see (often what we would not have perceived with our 
naked eyes). But there is always something that exists on its own, outside the 
categories: 
This something can force our structures and symbols to work radical trans­
formations upon themselves, in response to their own commands, as it were, 
though prompted from beyond their autonomous realm. What more persua­
sive indication can we have that ihere is a something out there, beckoning us, 
soliciting our wilful subjugation to its power to change our ways of seeing 
and living'? The control imposed by its objective, reconstituting force upon 
our subjective, constitutive powers challenges the limiting and distorting 
projections of our categories, finally breaking through the self-sufficient 
insularity of our visionary circles. What a Shakespeare or a Melville can do to 
the metaphysical and moral shapings of our imaginations, a Mallarme or a 
Proust can do to our consciousness of space and time as he freezes our world 
or lets it flow.28 
Krieger, too, it would appear, is concerned with the ways art changes people's 
lives. He is concerned, also, with the need for each person to affirm that he 
achieves his own vision, his own version. This is where the force of art is made 
palpable- at the private moment, in the interior of the individual who is a Single 
One. 
To engage in critical thinking about one's own art experiences is, I believe, to 
heighten self-consciousness with respect to the nature of art itself. This seems to 
me to be a clear case of the manner in which cognition can make the individual 
more aware of his own "experienced context."29 Such awareness can be nur-
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tured even more if the individual is moved to "do" philosophy in the course of 
his engagement with the humanities: and I believe that philosophic thinking 
must play a part in such engagement if it is to liberate in the way I think it can. 
By philosophy I do not mean the work of the Platonic Academy, nor do I mean 
(returning to Levi's account of the tradition) "mingling the ghost of Plato with 
the essentials of decorous behavior." Treating philosophy .as a distinctive human 
activity, I have in mind the asking of particular kinds of qwestions-interesting 
questions, what some call "queer" questions., unanswerable by purely formal 
statements or by statements of empirical fact. Some of them are critical or 
analytical. They have to do with the clarification of terms, the examination of 
arguments, the uncovering of assumptions. Some are synthetic and have to do 
with the blending of perspectives, the integration of disparate experiences, the 
emergence of order or meaningfulness. Others have to do with conceptions of 
the desirable, with what the individual believes ought to be; and still others have 
to do with explorations of consciousness and of the multiple ways in which 
reality presents itself to the existing human being. And then there are those that 
have to do with human history-"the metaphysical fact that the same life, our 
own, is played out both within us and outside us, in our present and in our 
past . . . .  "30 
I believe these questions can be-4;hould be-asked by persons who stand in 
the midst of life; not apart from it. I believe they should be asked from the van· 
tage point of their life situations, whatever these may be. If they are posed 
against "background awareness" and if they are thematically relevant, in the 
sense of being close to the individual's fundamental projects and interests, they 
can do much to help the individual feel himself to be a "Subject." They can do 
much to help him attain the "reciprocity of perspectives"3 1 that often brings 
coherence to a world. For these reasons, they seem to me to be integral to a 
study of the humanities, if (again) the humanities are regarded as opportunities 
to become self-conscious and to engage in the kind of knowing that transforms. 
An elementary school teacher does not require a course in advanced philos­
ophy to learn how to ask, "What are we to take the humanities to mean? How 
are vve to use the concept 'art'? What assumptions underly the claim that 
involvement with the arts can 'change your Jife'? If a critic's categories or 
principles make him look at a poem or play as an 'object' hermetically sealed 
away from life concerns, what does he exclude? If a critic's categories make him 
see the work as an expression of an artist's feelings, mainly, what does he ex­
clude? In any case, what does understanding of criticism or the arts have to do 
with our teaching in the schools?" None of the responses can be absolute; none 
can be empirical. But, in the very asking, the individual will become more 
thoughtful about his own encounters with art forms. He will become aware of 
what is happening to him when, say, he encounters an entirely new form-an 
apparent non-novel, for example, like Donald Barthelme's Snow White; the spare 
bars of a "minimal" painting; a ritual drama or a "happening"-and asks him-
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self the sense in which it can be considered to be art. He will become more aware 
of the differences among the perspectives provided to him by the critics and even 
the daily reviewers. In time, he may become able to choose among them in 
terms of what each reveals in his autonomous experiences with the arts. Freed to 
choose, freed to appropriate critical points of view of significance for him, he 
may find himself to be more sensitive to the multiple ways there are of making 
sense. He may come to realize that the learning he is trying to stimulate in his 
classroom is not unlike the shaping of experience made possible by the arts. He 
may come to see in a new way the importance of self-initiated learning and 
shaping, the centrality of the vital individual trying to constitute meanings in his 
world. 
There seems to me no 1question that the self-reflectiveness made possible by 
art experiences thrusts the individual into explorations of his own life's develop· 
ing themes and cumulative meanings. This is what "background awareness" 
signifies. _Krieger, in the passage quoted above, mentions Marcel Proust, whose 
whole life work communicates a sense of such awareness. In Remembrance of 
Things Past, Proust compares the lack of such awareness wilth awaking in the 
middle of the night, not knowing where one is, "emptied of that past which 
was previously our life." The human being, for Proust, is someone who is forever 
trying to find out who and where he is and to justify his existence as he 
searches. 
For this is the point to which we must always return, to these beliefs with 
which most of the time we are quite unconsciously filled, but which for all 
that are of more importance ro our happiness than is the average person 
whom we see, for it is through them that we see him, it is they that impart his 
transitory grandeur to the person seen.32 
Returning in this fashion, recovering himself and his memories, the individual 
may find himself recalling his "primary reality," or his earliest perceived world 
where his perceptual history began. And this may move him into a unique 
"wideawakeness," because it makes him so dramatically aware of his own life's 
sedimented meanings, of tlhe way his original perceptions are the ground of his 
intellectual consciousne�, the domain where rationality began. 
I am saying that self-reflectiveness and the recovery of the past are what most 
effectively stimulate the plhilosophic questioning necessary to make things clear. 
An example of this is Tarrou's realization in The Plague that "our troubles 
spring from our failure to use plain, clean-cut language," our failure to be cleM. 
It is notable that he says this after he tells the story of his life, after he recalls 
his original perceptions and his gradual constitution of the meanings of "plague." 
Tarrou, at that moment of friendship, may be regarded as someone moved to the 
asking of critical questions by his awakening to himself. Among the things I am 
suggesting here is that such awakening can be advanced by involvement in the 
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humanities if that involvement is self-conscious and pervaded by worthwhile 
questioning. 
The asking of synthetic questions is integral to the pursuit of order in exper­
ience and to the recovery described above. Merleau-Ponty talks of the ways in 
which we continually witness "the miracles of related experiences, and yet no­
body knows better than we do how this miracle is worked, for we are ourselves 
this network of relationships."33 He means that the living individual, existing 
in multiple realities, seeks at some level to integrate them. He tries_, with differ­
ing degrees of self-consciousness, to overcome fragmentation and incomplete­
ness, to unify his world. Stephen Dedalus, in A Portrait of the Art ist, tries­
through seeing and "naming"-to create order out of a life composed of dis­
parate parts: Jesuitry; Irish nationalism; the squalor of Dublin; ships on the 
river; an alcoholic father; an "indifferent God"; the enticements of art. When he 
finally breaks with the sentries of his past, when he finally exorcises the forces 
that have determined him, he has begun transcending the posturing, conflicted 
youth he has been: "Welcome, 0 life! I go to encounter for the millionth time 
the reality of experience and to forge in the smithy of my soul the uncreated 
conscience of my race."34 Ralph Ellison's narrator in Invisible Man, hibernating 
underground after shattering experiences in a world that has refused him, must 
somehow make a coherent fabric out of the "battle royal" in the southern town, 
expulsion from his college, the accident at the Liberty Paint factory, the eviction 
in Harlem, the Brotherhood, Tod Clifton's Sambo dolls, Ras the Exhorter, the 
chain link, the riot, Rinehart, all the rest. He does so by going a long way back,! 
more than twenty years . . "All my life I had been looking for something, and 
everywhere I turned someone tried to tell me what it was. I accepted their 
answers too, though they were often in contradiction and even self-contra­
dictory. I was naive. I was looking for myself and asking everyone e�cept myself 
questions which I, and only I, could answer."35 And finally, after the journey 
back inside himself, back to the primordial silences and to his first memories of 
his grandfather's words, he says: "In going underground, I whipped it all except 
the mind, the mind. And! the mind that has conceived a plan of living must never 
lose sight of  the chaos against which that pattern was conceived."36 He, too, 
has effected a synthesis, a pattern. Transcending himself, he has attained visi­
bility-and, yes the ability to love. 
I am asking the elementary school teacher, as he begins confronting the 
humanities, to pose the kinds of questions that will help him conceive "a plan 
of living" of his own. How can he develop the reciprocal perspectives that may 
enable him to relate the reading of a Wordsworth poem to teaching a child to 
read? How can he blend the perceptions gained from involvement with film art 
with those gained in his methods class? How can he integrate his study of Piaget 
with, say, his interest in Martin Buber's "I-Thou"?37 How can he be a person 
and a practitioner, a student and an active citizen, a thinker and a member of 
a class or of a school? As in the case of Stephen Dedalus and Ellison's narrator 
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(and Melville's Ishmael, Fitzgerald's Nick Carraway, Faulkner's Ike McCaslin, 
and Virginia Woolf's Mrs. Ramsay), the teacher himself is the only one who can 
weave together the disparate materials of his own life. It is his life, that is why. 
It is experience as it presents itself to him. As Merleau-Ponty put it, he and no 
one else is the network of relationships.in his own life-world. Engagements with 
art works may suggest to him some of the ways in which unities can be created­
ways in which his own existence can resemble art. Dewey, in Art as Experience, 
speaks much about perceiving relationships between "what is done and what is 
undergone," about experiences having pattern and structure when the doing and 
undergoing are clearly related. We have "an experience," he says, "when the 
material experienced runs its course to fulfillment," and when "every successive 
part flows freely, without seam and without unfulfilled blanks, into what en­
sues."38 There may be the likelihood of' more such experiences in the indi­
vidual's life if he consciously asks the kinds of philosophical questions which 
evoke syntheses in response. 
The feeling of incompleten�, like feelings of estrangement and alienation, is 
a familiar one. Sometimes it seems from the realization that life is an affair of 
chance and contingencies, that things-and experiences-seldom run their course 
to fulfillment. Sometimes it stems from the troubling suspicion that. perceptions 
are only partial, that a solution or an "answer" waits tantalizingly around the 
bend. The feeling is often the motivating force in the quest far-meanings. n may, 
if articulated and made manifest, lead to problem-posing and a deliberate effort 
at problem-solving. It may lead to conscious efforts to effect desired change. 
At a point like this questions may be asked about values-""about the nature 
of the desirable. Aware of blockage!> to his activity, aware of lacks in a situation, 
the individual cannot avoid thinking about what can be done to make things 
better. Almost always there is more than one alternative solution to his problem: 
it is not simply a matter of breaking free or hurdling a fence; it is not simply a 
matter of pulling a lever or patching a hold. In The Plague, although nothing can 
be done to stop the pestilence, those concerned about survival as decent human 
beings choose to join the sanitary squads. Most of the townspeople, however, do 
nothing. They suffer; they accommodate in various ways; they distract them­
selves; they commit crimes. They are people unable or unwilling to ask questions 
about what is right and good. Considering no alternatives to mere habit or 
desire, they do not choose; and so they are not ethical beings. They feel no 
summonses in their own consciousness; they respond to no recognizable norms. 
The present moment in history is characterized by a terrible numbness in 
many places. People hear about massacres, bombings, torture, corruption, and 
they do not care. My own view is that nothing is more important than sensiti­
vity to moral issues; nothing is more vital to an authentic human life than the 
ability to care. As we have seen, the humanities traditionally were treated as 
storehouses of moral values or windows through which to see the Good. Even 
today, persons speak of the humanities as if values do indeed inhere in them, as 
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if involvement with them will bring people in touch with some moral ideal. 
There are those who speak of finding "moral exemplars" in works of art, who 
speak of finding "models" and standards by which people can govern their con­
duct today. One reason for this is that they still look at works of art as windows 
through which they can see an order in the universe, a grand classical design. Ex­
cluding from the category "art" the works that diminish man and make his life 
·absurd, they discern such images as that of Michelangelo's David or the giant 
figures on the Sistine ceiling. When they think of literature, they think of tragic 
heroes like Prometheus and Oedipus, or larger-than-lifesize beings like Beowulf, 
Macbeth, Captain Ahab, St. Joan. They do not need to be virtuous creatures to 
evoke admiration and awe. They need only be potent, self-assertive heroes and 
heroines, whose very existence demonstrates the power and centrality of the 
human being under the sky. As if the world of the humanities were a vast 
Sistine Chapel, those who enter in are expected to look upwards. Inspired and 
aspiring, they are to stand up tall. 
My view of the moral significance of engagement with the humanities is 
entirely different. I do not in any way believe that readers and beholders can 
be redeemed through encounters with beautiful or harmonious forms. Nor do I 
believe that an education in the humanities will guarantee decency or commit­
ment on the part of any individual. We have been told too often of the 
graduates from the best fine arts faculties in Europe who supported the bestial­
ities of the Nazis. 39 An experience with the film, The Sorrow and the Pity, 
makes it painfully clear that a liberal arts education has little or nothing to do 
with the stance taken with respect to collaboration with an enemy. In fact, if 
there are any heroes in the film, they are the two peasant brothers who fought 
with the Resistance. There is no evidence that they had more than a primary 
education. Certainly they had no training in study of the humanities. 
What, then, is the "good" of the humanities where responses to value ques­
tions are concerned? My answer refers back to what I have already said about 
self-consciousness and clarity. I think of Nietzsche's Thus Spake Zarathustra, 
as I ponder self-awareness, and Zarathustra's saying: " 'This is my way, where is 
yours?Z-thus I answered those who asked me 'the way'. For the way-that does 
not exist."40 I lhink of Sartre saying that the end to which literature offers it· 
self "is the reader's freedom."41 Various works composing the humanities can, 
I believe, move people to reflection upon themselves and to choose what to 
make of themselves within their own historic situations. This, to me, is the crux 
of the matter where morality is concerned. Free people (including free elemen­
tary teachers) write their own histories; they are the authors of their own lives. 
But they must act and choose in terms of the reality given to them by way of 
consciousness. Too often, they do not and cannot confront that reality. Con· 
ventions, automatisms, stock notions, idees fixes of all kinds disguise or deform 
the impinging world. Too many human beings are like Emma Bovary in Gustave 
Flaubert's novel. She, it will be recalled, looked at the world through the lenses 
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of romantic novels; dramatizing each event in her ordinary bourgeois life, she 
made demands that were unanswerable. Seeking an extravagant existence and a 
grand passion, she was incapable of recognizing that her own husband, the dull 
Doctor Bovary, loved her passionateiy, indeed romantically. Blinded by illusions 
and discontent, she cared neither for him nor for her child. It was not that the 
world actually presented itself to her as if it were a sentimental novel. She 
deliberately clung to an inauthentic vision, which distanced her from her own 
personal world, and which inexorably destroyed her freedom before it destroyed 
her life. It is not accidental that the term "bovarisme" is used to describe an 
attitude characterized not only by attachment to illusions but one marked by 
what is called "bad faith." 
I am saying that informed participation in the humanities can make it 
possible for individuals to recover a true vision of their lives. To find them­
selves and that vision, they must become reflective about their situations; they 
must experience the "anguish" which is a sign of freedom, meaning the recog­
nition of multiple possibilities among which they personally must choose. I 
realize all too well that a conception of morality focusing upon freedom, 
authenticity, and choice is not one I.hat offers any guarantees. But traditional 
absolutist approaches to morality, with their assumptions of a pre-existing good 
and right, never solved the problem of whether the ability to' know or intuit or 
"see" the good ensured right action by the indi\'"idual concerned. I am saying 
that reflectiveness and responsibility increase the chances of authentic, caring 
action in the world. I am saying that I find my only hope in persons becoming 
conscious of themselves and of the need to impose order on a shapeless, unjust 
world. The order, after all, may 'be a moral order. It may be the kind that 
summons the individual to what is called "idealistic" behavior, especially when 
he himself defines the ideals and chooses them to govern the life he lives. Only 
when he does feel himself to be the author of that life, is he likely to consider 
values seriously. To consider them seriously is to be deliberative on occasion 
with regard to conditions and consequences; it is to concern oneself with "good 
reasons" for the decision one makes; it is to identify the terms of the responsi­
bility one shoulders when one is passionately involved with other human beings 
and their freedoms. This, to me, is what describes the moral life. 
In order to be clear about self-consciousness and reflectiveness, the person 
needs to be aware that consciousness is not to be understood as mere inward­
ness or introspection. As I am using the term, it refers to what thrusts towards 
the world, not away from it. It refers to the diverse modes of coming in touch 
with things, events, and other people. Each individual engages in many kinds of 
activity which bring him in touch with the world, or activity by means of which 
the world presents itself to him_ Among the types of activity I have in mind are 
perceiving, judging, believing, remembering, imagining, valuing. These are the 
ways in which the experiencing person is conscious of the world. It must be 
added that consciousness is characterized by intentionality: it is always of 
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something-something which, when grasped, relates to the act of consciousness 
involved as the meaning of that act. 
There are numerous examples in literature that may make this clear. I recall 
Herman Melville's "Bartleby the Scrivener" and the way in which, through the 
narrator's act of consciiousness (his judging, perceiving, categorizing), "the 
scrivener's pale form" presented itself and stood before his mind.42 I recall 
E. M. Forster's Passage to India and the way in which, through Mrs. Moore's 
fatigued act of consciousness (remembering, .in this cas�, intuiting, imagining), 
the echo of the Malabar caves presented itself, murmuring, "Pathos, piety, 
courage-they exist, but are identical, and so is filth. Everything exists, nothing 
has value."43 I recall Franz Kafka's K. being arrested at the start of The Trial 
and the way the two strangers presented themselves to him: "Who could these 
men be? What were they talking about? What authority did they represent?"44 
Each of these characters is speaking from his or her life-world, or the world as he 
or she experiences it through the multiple acts of consciousness of which every­
one is capable. Indeed, each of these fictions dramatizes the multiplicity. 
Melville's lawyer-narrator, Mrs. Moore, and .K .  all move from one reality, or one 
sub-universe of meaning, to another and still another. The "suspense" in each 
tale derives from the shocks each character experiences as he or she is forced to 
break with what seemed given, with "socially constructed reality."45 
And, indeed, these shocks are precisely the ones I would seek through in­
volvement with the humanities. I believe that they are likely-and conse.quen­
tial-to the extent that involvement is self-reflective. The individual reader or 
beholder (in the face of conventional wisdom with respect to art experiences) 
who can ask questions albout what is happening to him and within him, who 
can-with the aid of the works he encounters-situate himself in time· and space 
in his own authentic way, will have the experience of expanding co�sciousness. 
Reading Antigone, seeing Sophocles' or Jean Anoulh's Antigone, he will con­
front for himsel( the conflict between moral law (or the demands of 
conscience) and a civil law conceived to be inequitable, unjUJst. Not only will he 
participate imaginatively in a struggle for freedom that is carried to the extreme; 
he will participate with his own memories of civil rights struggles in the present, 
or anti-war demonstrations, or campus revolts. Not only will the ancient tale of 
Antigone become strangely relevant; the contemporary dialogue respecting free­
dom will take on a new resonance. The reader or beholder who is sensitive and 
lucky will indeed find out that "the same life, our own . . . .  " is played out in 
the past as well as the present. Since the playing out-the experiencing and the 
remembering-are occurring in the same inner time, relationships may suddenly 
become apparent that were not apparent before; depths may open up below the 
surfaces of the present, and the contours of things may be quite changed. 
Reading William Blake's "London," with its challenge to exploitation and to 
"mind-forg'd manacles,"46 reading Baudelaire's defiances of boredom and vul­
garity,47 reading Dostoevsky's "Notes from Underground,"49 the reader can-
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not but be aware of the ways in which metaphors and images developed in the 
past are used today to make sense of quite another world. Would the individual 
be likely to see cities as he does today, were it not for the poets who wrote of 
anonymity and loneliness in time past? Would he be likely to think of sub­
jectivity and the unconsciousness as he does, were it not for the metaphor of the 
"underground"? Walter Ong speaks, as I have noted, of "historically based self­
study." I take this to mean an approach to the humanities which focuses upon 
predicaments in the present but which continually expands the vision of the 
present and, at once, sheds light on the past. 
I am quite aware of the a-historical tendencies among young people today. I 
am equally aware of the feeling that the past is dead and ought not to be 
resuscitated, that the works and words of the past have nothing to say to con­
temporary men. I am familiar, too, with the claims that museums and libraries 
are only storehouses of useless objects; with the idea that once the process of 
creating is done, the painting or the poem is nothing but a waste product, to be 
ignored or disposed of as waste products ought to be. These views seem worth 
attending to in situations where the works and ideas of the past are treated as 
sacred writs or (as D. H. Lawrence once said) as "monuments and ponderosities." 
They are worth attending to when teachers of the humanities act as if they were 
missionaries from the House of Intellect, bringing enlightenment to students 
perceived as benighted natives of some kind. 
If, however, the emphasis is placed upon the individual's own present and his 
own life.world, I see no point to rejecting history. The past can be chosen, can 
be appropriated by the contemporary person as he effects refationships within 
his inner time and tries to see for l\imself. Just as he traces back relevant themes 
within his own life history, so can he trace back themes in human history. To 
learn how men have shaped the world. 
Somewhat in the mood of T. S. Eliot, I see the works encompassed by the 
humanities existing simultaneously in tim�in my inner time, my temporality; 
and each one of which is ready to be tapped as pos.5ibility. I do not see the 
ancient ones as windows on an ordered cosmos, although I realize (finding this 
interesting too) that many of them were conce.ived of that way when they were 
made. I do not see The Divine Comedy, for instance, as a representation of an 
exemplary human journey towards the Infinite; I do not see The Odyssey as a 
great transparency permitting a vision of objective human grandeur. Nor do I see 
these works as independently existent, without cultural tie or influence. Each 
work has arisen out of the imagination of a particular individual enmeshed in 
a particular cultural experience, making his own interpretation of the world as it 
presented itself to him. And the works that followed his, works made by other 
men, were inserted into a world in which his work inescapably existed. So 
Hamlet arose in a world where Oedipus Rex and The Divine Comedy already had 
a place and exerted influence; and, after many years, Gulliver s Tra vels and 
Tristam Shandy and Emile surged into the world against the background of what 
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had been. When Hamlet appeared, Oedipus Rex took on new meaning, not only 
for those in Elizabethan times but for us, who read them both at a later moment 
in history, with Ibsen's works intervening, Arthur Miller's Death of a Salesman, 
Beckett's Waiting for Godot. Just as Turner's luminous landscapes took on a new 
significance when people learned to appreciate the Impressionists' paintings of 
light, just as Claude Monet's haystacks and cathedrals took on a new meaning 
when Willem DeKooning went to work, so the drama and poetry and novels of 
the past hold possibilities of meaning that are always new, as they are appro­
priated by new minds, as they become events in individuals' life-worlds. 
If elementary teachers can treat the past as possibility, they can intensify 
their own self-consciousness. Also, somewhat more authentically than otherwise, 
they may communicate to their students what it means to push back the walls of 
time. Of great importance, it seems to me, is the part that may be played by 
such experiences in enabling persons to cope with impersonality, to fight the 
plague. Many of the works mentioned in the course of this paper have presented 
visions of darkness, of chaos. It may be the darkness of plague, as in Oedipus 
Rex and Invisible Man, or of nation-wide corruption, as in Hamlet. It may 
simply be the darkness of the wood in which the individual, Dante, finds him­
self in the middle of his life, when the animals that symbolize his vices prevent 
him from climbing the mountain towards the sun. It may be the darkness of the 
highways traversed by Willy Loman, Miller's salesman, who lives a life of such 
tragic bad fait.h. It may be the darkness of the road beside which Beckett's 
derelicts wait for Godot, or the darkness of the underground room in Invisible 
Man, or the darkness of the Oran streets emptied by the plague. 
What is the darkness but the reality that each individual, in his own fashion, 
must transform? To confront that reality, he must become self-eonscious; to 
change it, he must engage in cognitive action-the praxis I have spoken of 
throughout. In the face of such a challenge, encounters with the humanities 
may be conceived to be modes of action conducted by persons, each one aware 
of what he is doing, each one struggling to be present in the world. This is what 
I am arguing for, where elementary school teachers are concerned. I have not 
discussed the logistical problems involved in making room for the humanities in 
college programs. I have touched only tangentially upon the implications for 
the teaching of the young. That is because it seems to me to be so evident that 
learning is a matter of choosing to make sense of things, to impose orders upon 
realities otherwise inchoate. 'l'he teacher who himself is constantly experiencing 
the process of sense-making, who is attempting to come in touch with himself, 
seems to me to be the teacher best equipped to move other persons towards 
their freedom. 
The humanities, if engaged in participatively and thoughtfully, can be dis­
tinctive in the confrontations they make possible and the problems they arouse. 
They can be distinctive, too, as means of countering inhumanity by choice. Only 
the human being, after all, can feel himself to be a stranger. Only the human 
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being can experience indifference and injustice-and will to rebel. Only the 
human being can experience incompleteness, the gap between what is and what 
might be. Only the human being, finally, can begin to fill the gap by moving 
out in search of meaning and transcendence-moving out to change his world. 
I think of Wallace Stevens' poem, "The Idea of Order at Key West," and of 
how the speaker's woman companion imposes a human intelligibility on the 
world by speaking and by singing. And the speaker says at the end: 
Oh! blessed rage for order, pale Ramon, 
The maker's rage to order words of the sea, 
Words of the fragrant portals, dimly-starred, 
And of ourselves and of our origins, 
In ghostlier demarcations, keener sounds. 49 
He is talking of naming and of exploring origins; he is talking of bringing a 
significance to life. It is the rage of praxis and self-consciousness that the human­
ities can arouse in elementary school teachers. They, too, must be the authors of 
their lives. 
FOOTNOTES 
1Paulo Freire, Pedagogy of the Oppressed (New York: Herder and Herder, 1970), p. 67. 
2Maurice Mexleau-Ponty, PhenomenoloJty of Percep tion (London : Routeledge Kegan Paul 
ktd., 1962), p. xvii. 
Albert Camus, The Plague (New Yoxk: Alfred A. Knopf, 1948), p. 229. 
4Hannah Arendt. "Thinking and Moral Considerations," Social Research, Vol. 38, No. 3, 
e-ugust 1971, P. 445. 
Alfred Schutz, "The Life World," in, Collected Papers III, ed. Maurice Natanson (The 
Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1967), p, 117. 
6 Albert William Levi, The Humanities Today (Bloomington: Indiana Univ. Press, 1970), 
�· 19. 
Levi, op . . cit., p. 29. 
8Harold Taylor, "The Arts and the Humanities," in The Humanities in the Schools: A �ontempoxaxy Symposium, ed. Harold Taylor (New York: Citation Press, 1968), pp. 25-26. 
Walter J. Ong, "Crisis and Understanding In the Humanities," in "The Futuxe of the 
�uroanities," Daedalus, Summer 1969, p. 618. �Jacques Ellul, The Technologfcal Society (New Yo:rk: Vintage Books, 1967), P. 14. 
l Ellul, ibid., p. 321. 
12B. F. Skinner 
12B. F. Skinnex, Beyond Freed:om and Dignity (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1971), p. 215. 
13Henri Bergson, Creative Evolution (New York: Heruy Holt and Company, 1931), pp. 4-6; 
f·Jl. 4william James, Principles of Psychology, Vol. I (New York: Heruy Holt and Co., 1950), 
£g· 224-290. 
James Joyce, A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man (New Yoxk : The Viking Press, 
H57), P. 15. 
Jean-Paul Saxtre. The PsycholoJty of Imagination (New York: The Citadel Pxess, 1948), 
r., 26s. 8sartre, Literature and Existentialism, 3rd ed. (New York: The Citadel Press. 1965), p. 43. 
1 John Dewey ,Art as Experience (New Yoxk: Minton, Balch & Company, 1934), p. 54. 
19Harold Pinter, The Caretaker (The Caretaker & The Dumb Waiter) (New York: Grove 
�bess, 1961), p. 19. 
21 
Pinter, op. cit., p. 60. 
Freire, op. cit., p. 66. 
22Jean·Paul Sartre, Search for a Method (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1963), p. 92. 23oorothy Walsh, "The Cognitive Content of Art," in Contemporary Studies in Aesthetics, 
ed. Francis J. Coleman (New York : McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1968), p. 285. 
61 
20
Philosophic Exchange, Vol. 4 [1973], No. 1, Art. 12
http://digitalcommons.brockport.edu/phil_ex/vol4/iss1/12
COGNITION AND CONSCIOUSNESS 
24Arnold Isenberg, "Critical Communication," in Cont.emporary Studies in Ae sthetics, 
lo t5o. . . 
2 
Merleau-Ponty, op. cit., p. 235. 
2
�susanne K. Langer, Feeling and Form (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1953), p.  413. 
Joseph Conrad, "Preface to The Nigger of th� 'Narcissus', " reprinted in Myth and 
Method, ed. James E. Miller, Jr. (Lincoln, Nebraska: University of Nebraska Press, 1960), �k 30-3 1. 
Murray Krieger, "Literary Analysis and Evaluation-and the Ambidextrous Critic," in 
Criticism, ed. L. S. Dembo (Madison, Wisconsin: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1968), 
p. 35. 
29 Aron Gurwitsch. "Towa:rds a Theory of Intentionality," Philosophy and Phenomeno­
lo�ical Research, March 1970, XXX, No. 3, p. 364. auMerleau-Ponty, "The Crisis of the Understanding," in Tile Primacy of Perception, ed. 
James M. Edie (Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 1 964). P. 204. 
31 Alfred Schutz, "Symbols. Reality, and Society.'' Collected Papers I (The Hague: Martinus 
N�boff, 1967), p. 315.  3: Marcel Proust, Remem brance of Things Past, I (New York: Random House, 1927), p. 708. 
33Merleau-Ponty, op. cit., p. xix. 
34Joyce, op. cit., p, 253. 
��Ralph Ellison, Invisible Man (New York: New American Library, 1952), p. 19. 
37
Ellison, ibid., p. 502. 
38
Martin Buber, I and Thou (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1970). 
Dewey, op. cit.,p. 35. 
39George Steiner, Language and Silence (New York: Atheneum, 1967), P. 61. 
40Friearicb Niet7.scbe, "Thus Spake Zarathustra: First Part," in The Portable Nietzsche, 
e1. Walter Kaufmann (New York: The Viking Press, 1958), p. 152. 4 Sartre, op. cit., p. 48. 
42Herman Melville, "Bartlcb y the Scrivener." in Selected Writings of Herman Meluille (New 
York: The Modem Library, 1952), p. 23. 43E. M. Forster, A Passage to India (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1952), p. 149. 
44Fram:; Kafka, The Trial (B<!ltimore: Penguin Books, 1 9�2), p. 7 ,  
45Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann, The Social Construction o f  Reality (New York: 
Apchor Books, 1967). 
46wnllam Blake, "London,'' in William Blake, ed. J. Bronowski (Baltimore: Penguin Books. 
H5s>. p. 52. 
Charles Baudelaire, "To the Reader," Flowers of Euil (New York: New Dir�ctions Press, 
uss). 
Fyodor Dostoyevsky, "Notes from Underground,'" in The Short Novels of Dostoyevsky 
<New York: Dial Press, 1945). 
49wa1Jace Stevens, "The Idea of Order at Key West," in The Collected Poems of Wallace 
Steven.5 (New York: Alfred A. Kn<;>pf, 1964),. p. 130. 
62 
21
Greene: Cognition and Consciousness
Published by Digital Commons @Brockport, 1973
